SMU Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 4 Annual Survey of Texas Law

Article 21

January 1998

Personal Torts
Frank L. Branson

Recommended Citation
Frank L. Branson, Personal Torts, 51 SMU L. REV. 1259 (1998)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol51/iss4/21

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

PERSONAL TORTS
Frank L. Branson*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

NEGLIGENCE ..........................................
A. DUTY AND BREACH .................................
B. CAUSATION ..........................................
C. NEGLIGENT HIRING .................................
D. NEGLIGENCE PER SE ................................
E.

II.

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE .........................

1. Medical Malpractice..............................
2. Medical MalpracticeStatute of Limitations........
3. Legal Malpractice ................................
ADDITIONAL TORTS ..................................
A. DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT ....................
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS .
C.

D.
E.
F.
G.

PREMISES LIABILITY .................................
PRODUCT LIABILITY .................................
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ...........................
LIQUOR LIABILITY ...................................
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE ...........................

III. D EFEN SES ..............................................

1260
1260
1261
1261
1262
1263
1263
1264
1266
1267
1267
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272

1272

A.

GOVERNMENTAL/OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

B.

TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT ...........................

1274

1. Premises or Special Defect ........................
2. Condition or Use of Property.....................

1274
1274
1275
1276

...............

C. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF TORT CLAIMS ............
D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ...........................
E. VICARIOUS LIABILITY ...............................
IV. IMPORTANT ISSUES ...................................
A.

B.

1272

1277

1277

D AMAGES ...........................................

1277

1. Mental Anguish ..................................
2. Punitive Damages ................................

1277
1278
1278
1279
1280

WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES ..................

C.

INSURANCE ..........................................

D.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION ..........................

* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., L.L.M., Southern Methodist University;
Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas. The writer wishes to acknowledge

the assistance of William B. Curtis, attorney, and Eleanor Starkey, law clerk, both of The
Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C.

1259

SMU LAW REVIEW

1260

I.

[Vol. 51

NEGLIGENCE

A. DUTY AND BREACH
raditional notions of duty and breach as a basis of negligence actions have not changed. Continuing the case-by-case refinements,
Texas courts have addressed both issues dozens of times in 1997.
Some of the more poignant fact scenarios follow.
In Smith v. Merritt,' a passenger was injured in an automobile accident.
The passenger sued the social hosts of a party at which the nineteen-yearold driver consumed alcoholic beverages, claiming that the hosts were
negligent and negligent per se in providing alcohol to the driver. Reasoning that the liability to third parties should rest with the drinker rather
than the social host, the Texas Supreme Court held that the social hosts
duty to the passenger to refrain from providing alcohad no common law
2
hol to the driver.
In Thornhill v. Ronnie's 1-45 Truck Stop, Inc.,3 the owner of a hotel
defaulted on loans he had borrowed to build the hotel, and rather than
repossess the property, the lender requested that the owner stay on the
property to operate the hotel for him. The hotel later caught fire and two
guests died. Finding that the relationship between the lender and the hotel owner was not simply a debtor/lender relationship because the lender
exercised control over the management and operation of the hotel, the
appellate court concluded that the lender was the possessor of the4 hotel
and owed a duty of care to keep the premises in a safe condition.
In Limon v. Gonzaba,5 a woman who was shot by her husband brought
an action against a drug and alcohol abuse counselor at the clinic where
her husband had been counseled, claiming that the counselor breached
his duty to warn her of the risk her husband posed to her. Applying the
Tarasoff/Thompson doctrine, 6 the Texas Supreme Court held that a
health care provider has a duty to warn an identifiable victim if it is reasonably foreseeable that the patient will injure or kill that person. 7 In this
case, the risk that the husband would harm his wife was not reasonably
foreseeable, and therefore, the counselor owed no duty to warn the wife.8
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Read9 involved the issue of an employer's liability
for the acts of an independent contractor. Kirby hired independent distributors to market vacuum cleaners, who were then required to recruit
door-to-door salespeople. The distributors were not required to conduct
background checks on prospective salespeople. In Fetzer, the plaintiff
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

940
See
944
See
940
See
See
See
945

S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 608.
S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
id. at 789.
S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
Limon, 940 S.W.2d at 240.
id. at 241.
S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted).
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was sexually assaulted in her home by a Kirby salesperson who had a
history of acting in a sexually inappropriate manner. Plaintiff sued the
salesperson, the distributor, and Kirby. Kirby argued that it breached no
duty to plaintiff, asserting that it was not responsible for the acts of an
independent contractor. The court of appeals disagreed and found that
Kirby did have a duty to take reasonable precautions to deter its distributors from hiring persons with histories of crime, violence, or sexually deviant behavior. 10

B.

CAUSATION

As with duty and breach, the concept of causation has not changed, but
it is often discussed. In Pena v. Van," two teenage girls were brutally
assaulted, raped, and murdered by a gang. The underage members of the
gang had been sold alcohol by Van. The trial court held that the assaults
and murders were not proximately caused by the sale of alcohol and
granted the defendants a summary judgment. Discussing the elements of
proximate cause (both cause in fact and foreseeability), the appellate
court reversed the summary judgment, finding that the defendant did not
produce any summary judgment evidence to show that the assaults were
unforeseeable.' 2 The court recognized that causation is usually a factual
3
issue best left to the jury and remanded the case for trial.'
In Nash v. Perry,14 the Nashes claimed that their children were molested at a day care facility and sued the defendants for common law negligence for failure to intervene or report the abuse and negligence per se
under the Texas Family Code sections regarding the reporting of abuse.
The appellate court held that the defendants were bystanders and had no
common law duty to intervene. 15 The Family Code did, however, establish a minimum threshold for defendants' conduct, 16 and the case was
remanded to allow the plaintiffs to attempt to prove a violation of that
7
standard of care as the cause of their injuries.'
C.

NEGLIGENT HIRING

The obligations of a potential employer were evaluated in several different contexts during 1997. In Guidry v. National Freight,Inc.,is a truck
driver hired by the defendant denied any prior criminal record. Without
checking with prior employers, conducting a background search, or con10. See id. at 859. See the further discussion of duty and breach in the context of
Liquor Liability in infra Section II (F), and the issues related to the duty to warn of the
addictive nature of tobacco in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
1997), in infra Section III (C).
11. 960 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
12. See id. at 104.
13. See id. at 105.
14. 944 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ granted).
15. See id. at 729.
16. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (Vernon 1996).
17. See Nash, 944 S.W.2d at 729-30.
18. 944 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
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firming the driver's claims, the defendant hired the driver for long haul
trips. During an unscheduled stop at an off-route location, the driver sexually assaulted Guidry. Finding that the assault on Guidry was not foreseeable, as she was not within the group of people with whom the driver
should have had contact, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the employer. 19 Although the employer might have
20
been negligent in hiring the driver, it owed no duty to Guidry.
Recall, also, the discussion of the Fetzer case in Section I(A) of this
Article. 21 A customer assaulted by a Kirby salesman sued the company
and its distributor for negligently hiring the salesman and allowing him to
perform in-home demonstrations, in light of his history of sexual crimes
and misconduct under prior employers. Recognizing that Kirby and the
distributor owed a duty to avoid putting their customers in such a dangerous position, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld a jury's verdict against
Kirby and the distributor for negligent hiring because Kirby failed to per22
form a reasonable investigation of the salesman before hiring him.
23
In St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital v. Agbor, a negligent credentialing
case, the plaintiffs sued the defendant hospital, claiming that the obstetrician who injured their child during delivery should not have been given
privileges to practice medicine at the hospital. The Texas Supreme Court
held that the Texas Medical Practice Act 24 governed the action. 25 This
Act protects peer review committees, which make decisions such as
granting privileges to doctors, from civil liability, unless malice on the
part of the committee can be shown. 26 Finding that the hospital's credentialing process fell within that protection, a summary judgment was affirmed due to a lack of evidence of malice by the hospital in granting
27
privileges to the obstetrician.
D.

NEGLIGENCE PER SE

Application of traffic regulations in civil litigation became the crux of
several appellate discussions this past year.
In Knighten v. Louisiana Pacific Corp.,28 Knighten stopped for traffic
ahead of her and was struck twice from behind by the two defendants.
During trial, plaintiff requested an amendment to her petition to add a
negligence per se allegation, which was refused by the trial court. Holding that negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because the trial
19. See id. at 808, 811.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id. at 811.
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
See Fetzer, 945 S.W.2d at 859.
952 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1997).
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (Vernon Supp. 1998).
See Agbor, 952 S.W.2d at 504, 506.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b.
See Agbor, 952 S.W.2d at 509.
946 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, writ requested).

1263

PERSONAL TORTS

19981

but merely
amendment would not have asserted a "new cause of action," 29
an additional facet of the negligence suit already being tried.
In Waring v. Wommack, 30 Waring was riding his bicycle when he was
struck by a motorist making a left turn. Waring requested a negligence
per se instruction, which was refused. The Austin Court of Appeals held
that the duties owed by the motorist were those of a reasonable driver
31
and that there was no absolute duty to avoid turning left into Waring.
of
Accordingly, Waring was not entitled to an instruction that a violation
32
traffic laws by the motorist could constitute negligence per se.
E.

PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE

1. Medical Malpractice
The field of professional negligence was often addressed by Texas
courts and the Legislature during this Survey period. Amendments to
article 4590i were confined largely to procedural issues such as filing expert reports or bonds. 33 Case law, however, revisited traditional areas of
interest.
In Eckmann v. Des Rosiers,34 Eckmann filed suit against her doctor,
claiming malpractice for lack of informed consent, among other things.
Attached to the defendant doctor's motion for summary judgment was a
form disclosure of the risks of Eckmann's surgery. This form was outdated and did not list all known risks, as compiled by the Texas Medical
Disclosure panel. 35 However, a second form used by the hospital did
comply with the requirements, and therefore, summary judgment was
36
affirmed.
In Tajchman v. Giller,37 Tajchman suffered from epilepsy and was considering the removal of a portion of her brain to correct the seizures. The
defendant doctors placed a probe in her brain to analyze the brain's internal functions. During the surgery, a vein was severed and the bleeding
caused a type of stroke. The plaintiff sued, claiming a lack of informed
consent. Although the severing of the vein was not disclosed as a possiand thus, a
ble risk or hazard, the consequences (a stroke) were disclosed,
38
summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed.
In Sampson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital System, 39 Sampson was suffering from an insect bite and was taken to a local emergency room for
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
1998).
34.
35.
1988).
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
945
See
See
See

id. at 640-41.
S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
id. at 892.
id.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, Subchapter M,

§ 13.01 (Vernon Supp.

940 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no writ).
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4590i, Subchapter F, § 6.04 (Vernon Supp.
See
938
See
940

Eckmann, 940 S.W.2d at 396, 399.
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied).
id. at 99.
S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ granted).
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treatment. The emergency doctor administered some pain medication
and an antihistamine, then discharged Sampson. Fourteen hours later,
Sampson went into septic shock and was admitted to the intensive care
unit of a different hospital. In a medical malpractice case against the first
hospital, Sampson claimed that the hospital was vicariously liable for the
negligence of the independent contractor physicians staffing the emergency room. Discussing both "agency by estoppel" and "apparent
agency" theories, the San Antonio Court of Appeals followed Texas precedent and the near unanimous findings of other states in imposing vicarious liability on the hospital.40 The court went on to discuss sound public
policies confirming the need for vicarious liability to protect the patients
41
of hospitals.
In Parkway Hospital,Inc. v. Lee,42 Lisa Lee was given pitocin to accelerate the delivery of her son. Lee claimed that improper administration
of the drug caused her uterus to rupture, necessitated a hysterectomy to
save her life, and caused severe cerebral palsy to her son. Defendants
argued that Lee was not entitled to damages for injury to the family relationship. The court recognized that such injuries were significant and
43
worthy of compensation and affirmed the jury's $16,000,000 verdict.
2. Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations
During this Survey period, a great number of medical negligence cases
revolved around the timely filing of suit, the discovery of injuries, and the
discovery of causation.
In Diaz v. Westphal,44 the plaintiff suffered from Hodgkins disease. His
medical doctor treated him with drugs for more than seven years. In
1987, at the end of that period, the plaintiff began suffering from urinary
tract bleeding. He was treated by another doctor who advised reconstructive surgery in April, 1991, necessitated by the prolonged drug regimen administered by the first doctor. While in preparation for surgery,
Westphal was diagnosed with bladder cancer. He died in April, 1992, and
his wife brought suit against the first doctor in May, 1993. The defendant
was granted a summary judgment on the basis of the two-year statute of
limitations of article 4590i. 45 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that the Open Courts provision of the Texas Constitution does not toll
the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions, which are created by
statute rather than common law, as is required to invoke Open Courts
46
relief.
In Husain v. Khatib,47 Khatib sought the medical care of the defend40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
946
See
941
See

id. at 131-32.
id. at 134-35.
S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
id. at 590.
S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 97; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANrN. art. 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1998).

46. See Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 101;

TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 13.

47. 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 547, 1998 WL 107926 (March 13, 1998).
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ants for a breast exam. Although a mammogram showed anomalies,
Khatib was told that she did not have cancer. More than two years later,
Khatib was diagnosed with cancer and was told that the first mammogram was not properly read or followed up. Khatib hired an attorney
eight months later, and notice letters were immediately sent. After eighteen months of investigation, a suit was filed. The Texas Supreme Court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, measuring limitations from
the last date of treatment by the defendant. 48 The allegations of negligence revolved around a failure to properly diagnose cancer, which could
only have occurred during the last treatment; since suit was filed 49more
than two years after that treatment, plaintiff's claims were barred.
In Streetman v. Nguyen, 50 Streetman was diagnosed with cancer in October, 1993. He hired an attorney in late 1994. The attorney received an
expert's report in January, 1995, indicating that an X-ray taken in March,
1992, was misread and was a cause of Streetman's extensive cancer.
Streetman died in May, 1995, and thereafter, his survivors filed a wrongful death lawsuit. Finding that the statutory action for wrongful death did
not satisfy the elements necessary for an Open Courts tolling of the statute of limitations, the court affirmed the summary judgment for the
defendants. 51
The court of appeals grappled with the issue of whether the absolute
two-year statute of limitations set out in article 4590i applies to negligence claims brought against a professional association in Campbell v.
MacGregor Medical Association.52 Finding that it does, the court determined that a professional association falls within the definition of "health
care provider" in article 4590i. 53 The court then recognized that the article 4590i statute of limitations bars a negligence claim when the injury
was known within two years of its occurrence, even though the substan54
dard care was not discovered until later.
55
In Terry v. Abito, plaintiff's shoulder was dislocated during a therapy
session with physical therapists. Plaintiff sent timely notice of his intent
to assert a health care liability claim against the therapists and filed his
lawsuit two years and six days after the injury. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants based on the two-year statute
of limitations. Plaintiff appealed the summary judgment, contending that
the statute of limitations was tolled, and thus, the notice letters added
seventy-five days to the two year limitations period. Contrary to the
Campbell opinion,56 the court of appeals reasoned that article 4590i does
48. See id. at *2
49. See id.
50. 943 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
51. See id. at 171-72.
52. No. 01-94-01277-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 24, 1997, writ requested) (not designated for publication), 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2215.
53. See id. at *5.
54. See id.
55. 961 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet. h.).
56. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.

1266

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

not apply to physical therapists; plaintiff's claim instead fell under the
two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of general
57
negligence.
3.

Legal Malpractice

In Delp v. Douglas,5 8 the Delps brought a legal malpractice suit against
the attorneys who had represented the Delps in a business dispute. Mr.
Delp later filed personal bankruptcy, and his "asset," the malpractice
claim, was purchased by the insurance carrier for the defendant attorneys. Shortly after the purchase, the carrier (as the plaintiff) entered into
an agreed dismissal of the claim against the attorneys. The Delps argued
that the legal malpractice claim could not be assigned in Texas. The court
of appeals agreed and set aside the dismissal because the "plaintiff" carrier did not have the necessary privity to the malpractice and the
59
attorneys.
In the complicated web of the estate distribution for an oil and gas
mogul in Houston, the law firm of Vinson & Elkins was accused of malpractice, inter alia, in Vinson & Elkins v. Moran.60 Two of the beneficiaries were assigned the claims of the remaining beneficiaries and filed
suit against Vinson & Elkins. In appealing the $35,000,000 verdict, Vinson & Elkins argued that the plaintiffs could not take an assignment of a
legal malpractice claim. The court of appeals agreed, holding that public
61
policy prohibits the assignment of legal malpractice claims.
Arce v. Burrow62 concerned a series of explosions at a chemical plant in
Pasadena, Texas, that killed twenty-three people and injured hundreds
more. A number of those people were represented by the Umphrey,
Burrow firm. Their claims were settled for varying amounts and were
dismissed by agreement. Later, the plaintiffs accused the firm of negotiating the claims for an aggregate amount, then dividing that amount
among the various plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice claim
that was dismissed summarily for lack of evidence of damages because
the court of appeals held that the amounts received were fair, and therefore, the plaintiffs suffered no monetary damages. 63 Plaintiffs appealed,
arguing that a forfeiture of the attorneys' fees was warranted, even without individual monetary damages. Finding that a breach of the fiduciary
duty owed to a client might justify a fee forfeiture (even without actual
damages), the court of appeals held that whether to forfeit a fee is best
left to the jury in a legal malpractice claim; however, the amount of for57. See Terry, 961 S.W.2d at 531; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1998).
58. 948 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ granted).
59. See id. at 486, 491.
60. 946 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
61. See id. at 392-93.
62. 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. filed).
63. See id. at 244.
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64
feiture is to be decided by the court.

II. ADDITIONAL TORTS
Outside of negligence actions, Texas appellate courts were presented
with many opportunities to write on less traditional torts during the Survey period.
A.

DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT

In Rogers v. Cassidy,65 a city attorney brought a defamation action
against a private citizen who had written a letter to the editor that alleged
improprieties committed by the city attorney in connection with city elections. The court applied New York Times v. Sullivan,66 in holding that a
public official must show actual malice in order to recover damages for
doubted the veracity of
defamation, and found that the defendant never
67
his allegations and did not act with malice.
An individual committed suicide after a newspaper published a report
listing his name and the fact that he had been arrested for indecent exposure in Hogan v. Hearst Corp.68 His family sued the newspaper and the
author. The court of appeals held that publication of information obavailable police reports was not public distained from otherwise publicly
69
closure of private facts.
B.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In C.M. v. Tomball Regional Hospital,70 a minor was raped, and her
mother took her to the hospital twenty-three hours later to be examined.
The head nurse interviewed the minor in a public waiting room, implied
doubt that the minor had actually been raped, and refused to prepare a
"rape kit" on the minor. The plaintiff and her mother brought a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against the nurse. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants,
evidence did not rise to the necessary level of
noting that the plaintiff's
71
emotional distress.
In Johnson v. StandardFruit & Vegetable Co.,72 Johnson was participating in a march along Highway 59 in Houston when a Standard Fruit truck
crashed into the procession. Although Johnson was not physically injured
by the wreck, he brought a claim for negligent infliction of physical injuries (exacerbation of his Vietnam post-traumatic stress syndrome) and
64. See id. at 245.
65. 946 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
67. See Rogers, 946 S.W.2d at 444-46.
68. 945 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ).
69. See id. at 250-51.
70. 961 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
71. See id. at 245.
72. No. 01-95-01239-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 1997, pet. granted)
(not designated for publication), 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 4757.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following a lengthy discussion of emotional distress damages and from which torts they are recoverable, 73 the appellate court held that no special relationship exists between
a driver and the general public; therefore, the Standard Fruit driver committed no negligence against Johnson. 74 However, recognizing that the
conduct of the driver could be interpreted as intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, the court reversed the defendant's summary
75
judgment.
C.

PREMISES LIABILITY

The courts visited novel areas of contractor responsibility and resurrected aged theories of attractive nuisance in 1997 premises cases.
In Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, 76 a drilling crew-member employed by an independent contractor was injured. He and his wife sued
the general contractor and its on-site representative for negligence. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and the court of
appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs failed to establish the elements of premises-defect liability
against the on-site representative and failed to prove respondeat superior
liability against the general contractor for the negligence of the
77
employer.
An intoxicated boy was killed while climbing an electrical tower in
Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. Timmons.78 His mother sued the electric
company under the attractive nuisance doctrine, claiming that the tower
was such a nuisance. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
electric company and was affirmed at the appellate level. 7 9 The appellate
court held that recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine was precluded because the boy was of sufficient age and experience to know of
80
the dangers of being near high-voltage lines.
81
In Wal-Mart Stores v. Gonzalez, plaintiff was shopping at Wal-Mart
when she slipped and fell on macaroni salad that had been spilled on the
floor. She was awarded damages of $100,000. Wal-Mart appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence that it had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition of the macaroni. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in light of evidence demonstrat82
ing Wal-Mart's constructive knowledge of the spilled macaroni.
In Silva v. Spohn Health System Corp.,83 an employee of the defendant
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
See Johnson, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS at *6.
See id. at *7.
952 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1997).
See id. at 530.
947 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 1997).
See id. at 192.
See id. at 194.
954 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. filed).
See id. at 779.
951 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ denied).
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hospital was stabbed as she was entering her car to go home. At the time
she was stabbed, she was standing on the curb adjoining the street and
the defendant's property. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
defendant upon the trial court's finding that the defendant did not owe
plaintiff a duty when she was on the curb. The court of appeals reversed
and held that the defendant was required to protect plaintiff from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts on or adjacent to the defendant's
84
property.
Plaintiff was raped when another tenant from her apartment complex
entered her apartment through a sliding glass door in Cain v. Timberwalk
Apartments Partners,Inc. 85 Plaintiff sued the landlord and management
company, and a jury found in favor of the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the negligence instruction submitted to the
jury did not reflect the rule that a landowner or apartment manager has a
duty to use ordinary care to protect
against unreasonable and foreseeable
86
risks of harm by a third party.
D.

PRODUCT LIABILITY

Texas courts wrote detailed and thorough opinions in the field of product liability ranging from automobiles to asbestosis in 1997.
In Sipes v. GeneralMotors Corp.,8 7 Sipes was injured in an automobile
accident and sued the automobile's manufacturer, claiming that the failure of the airbag to deploy was the result of a defective product. The trial
court granted a summary judgment for the defendant based on the defendant's argument that the collision was a side-impact collision, which
should not deploy the driver's front airbag. The appellate court noted the
conflicting evidence of the direction of force and held that such a conflict
was a fact issue best left to a jury; accordingly, the court reversed.88 Further, in a well-reasoned discussion of the various theories in an automobile product liability action, the court held that the other sources of
summary judgment evidence offered by the plaintiffs raised necessary fact
issues regarding defective marketing and design, supporting a reversal. 89
In Rodriguez v. Hyundai Motor Co.,90 plaintiff was a passenger in a
Hyundai that was involved in a rollover accident. She sued the driver and
the manufacturer on various theories of negligence and product liability.
The appellate court reversed a jury's take-nothing verdict, holding that
the evidence presented at trial required a jury question on a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability. 91 Further, the court noted that the
same proof offered (roof crush and crash-worthiness) could support theo84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See
942
See
946
See
See
944
See

id. at 95-96.
S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ granted).
id. at 703.
S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, no writ).
id. at 152.
id. at 156-60.
S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted).
id. at 771.
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ries of both product liability and implied warranty, and both questions
92
should be submitted to a jury since the evidence had been admitted.
In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin,93 plaintiffs successfully
tried an action against Owens-Corning, alleging various product liability
theories and that asbestos exposure caused a number of different injuries.
Defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by consolidating
eighteen different plaintiffs for a single trial. In discussing Rule 174 and
the criteria supporting the consolidation (common issues of law and fact
among the cases), the court of appeals affirmed the jury's verdict. 94 Further, consistency in the verdicts among the plaintiffs did not support the
95
defendant's claim of prejudice.
E.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Efforts to turn the dismissal of criminal charges into successful civil
litigation were occasionally addressed by Texas appellate courts during
the Survey period.
One such case is Lang v. City of Nacogdoches.96 Vira Lang was ninetyone years old, and living in Nacogdoches. Her son William was entrusted
with her finances, to which her son Ben objected. Ben would occasionally visit, and these visits upset his mother. Vira then gave William a
power of attorney to prosecute trespassers. William instructed Ben to
cease the upsetting visits; Ben ignored the instruction, and William called
the police and filed criminal trespass charges against Ben. After the
charges were dropped, Ben sued William and all of the county officials
involved in his fourteen hour incarceration, alleging malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment for most of the defendants, holding that
the conduct of William was not outrageous, nor was the suit timely
filed.

97

In Digby v. Texas Bank,98 Digby used life insurance policies as collateral for a loan from Texas Bank. During repayment, Digby borrowed
from the insurance policies to repay the loan, allegedly with the knowledge and consent of a vice-president of Texas Bank. When Digby later
defaulted, Texas Bank attempted to liquidate the collateral and allegedly
learned for the first time of Digby's actions. Texas Bank filed with the
FDIC a Report of Apparent Crime regarding Digby's actions. Digby was
later acquitted by a jury. In a detailed discussion of the elements of malicious prosecution, the court of appeals recognized evidence of each element and reversed the summary judgment for Texas Bank. 99
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See
942
See
See
942
See
943
See

id. at 771-72.
S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
id. at 716-20.
id. at 720.
S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, writ denied).
id. at 758-60.
S.W.2d 914 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1997, writ denied).
id. at 918-25.
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LIQUOR LIABILITY

Responsibility for the sale and provision of alcohol remained a hotly
contested area of tort law, revolving around the interpretation of Texas
Alcoholic Beverage Code sections 106.01 and 106.06(a) 10 0 and common
law duties and obligations.
In Estate of Catlin v. GMC,10 1 a woman was killed after being struck by
a car driven by an employee who had become intoxicated at a fish fry
held on the defendant employer's property. The woman's estate sued the
defendant and its employees, and the trial court granted the defendants a
summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed and claimed that because defendant adopted a policy regarding the consumption of alcohol on its premises, and thereafter failed to follow the policy, a legal duty was created.
The court of appeals concluded that the mere creation of an internal policy regarding alcohol consumption does not create a duty per se; such a
duty would have been created only if the defendant had actual knowledge
of the employee's intoxication and then performed an affirmative act of
1 02
control over the employee's actions.
In Kovar v. Krampitz,10 3 an eighteen-year-old boy was killed in a car
accident after consuming alcohol at a party hosted by the defendants.
The parents of the deceased argued that the defendants owed both common law and statutory duties to avoid making alcohol available to their
son and to exercise reasonable care to ensure their son's safety after he
became drunk. There was no evidence that the defendants provided the
alcohol consumed by the deceased. Affirming the trial court's judgment,
the court of appeals held that the defendants owed no common law duty
as hosts to the deceased and did not violate any statutory duty created in
10 4
the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code.
In Gonzalez v. South Dallas Club,10 5 Gonzalez and her friends were
involved in an altercation at defendant's bar. Defendant's employees intervened and allowed Gonzalez to leave the bar through a back door to
avoid an additional altercation outside. About a mile from the bar, the
groups clashed again, and Gonzalez was injured. Gonzalez sued the bar,
alleging violations of the Dram Shop Act' 0 6 and negligent security. Because the defendant had no control over the premises where the injury
occurred, nor the parties causing the injuries, summary judgment was affirmed because the defendant had no duty to prevent the criminal con10 7
duct of third parties off of the defendant's premises.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

TEx. ALCO. BEy. CODE ANN. §§ 106.01, 106.06(a) (Vernon 1995).
936 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
See id. at 451.
941 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1996, no writ).
See id. at 252-54; TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 106.01, 106.06(a).
951 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1997, no writ).

106. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2 (Vernon 1995).

107. See Gonzalez, 951 S.W.2d at 75-76.
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SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

Recognizing a cause of action for general negligence in the keeping of
medical records, one Texas appellate court detailed both the public policies and the sister-state authority to support such an action in Ortega v.
108
Trevino.
Linda Ortega was injured during her birth. In a medical negligence
action against the obstetrician, all of Ortega's medical records were lost
or destroyed by the obstetrician. A separate suit was filed against the
obstetrician, alleging that he had a duty to preserve and maintain her
medical records. The loss of the records presented an insurmountable
hardship with regard to the medical negligence action for which the obstetrician should be held responsible. The court of appeals recognized
the procedural remedies available to a party in the face of spoliation of
evidence, specifically the presumption that the evidence would have favored the opposite party.' 0 9 The court further acknowledged that several
other states have recognized an action exclusively for the spoliation of
key evidence where the defendant had an obligation to preserve the evidence." 0 In light of the trend towards recognizing interference with prospective contracts in Texas, and the supporting authority from other
states that have directly addressed the issue, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals remanded the case for a jury's resolution of whether the destruction violated a duty owed by the obstetrician to his patient to not lose or
destroy medical records."'
III.

DEFENSES

Very few new defenses were raised by appellate courts, and the traditional theories underwent little change during the Survey period.
Although some legislative changes might be considered defense-oriented," 2 the practical impact on litigation will not be known for several
years.
A.

GOVERNMENTAL/OFFICIAL

IMMUNITY

Plaintiffs were struck by a police car during a high speed police chase in
Wadewitz v. Montgomery."13 The trial court denied the defendant officer's and the defendant city's motion for summary judgment, and the
court of appeals affirmed on an interlocutory appeal. The issue before
the Texas Supreme Court was whether the police officer responding to an
emergency call conclusively established that he acted in good faith enti108. 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, writ granted).
109. See id. at 220-21.
110. See id. at 221-22.
111. See id. at 223.
112. See, e.g., the forum non conveniens in TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.051 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998) and the limitations of landowners liability in TEX.
CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
113. 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997).
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tling him to the official immunity defense. The Court applied the City of
Lancasterv. Chambers1 4 test in which good faith depends on how a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed both the need to which an
officer responds and the risks of the officer's course of action, based on
the officer's perception at the time of the accident. The Texas Supreme
Court found that neither the city nor the officer provided conclusive evidence of the officer's good faith under the Chambers standard and af115
firmed the denial of summary judgment.
In City of Pharrv. Ruiz," 6 Officer Castillo and three other patrol cars
were in pursuit of a suspicious-looking vehicle when Castillo careened
into the Ruiz's car. Ruiz sued the city, alleging that the officers breached
their duty to drive with due regard and, pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims
Act, 117 failed to act in good faith by balancing the need to apprehend the
suspect with the risk of harm to the public. The trial court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that a fact issue existed regarding whether the actions of the officers were discretionary and
performed in good faith. The court of appeals determined that the officers' acts were discretionary, but upheld the denial of summary judgment because plaintiffs successfully rebutted defendants' good faith
8
claim."
Teresa, a sixth grader, reported to her teacher that she had been
threatened by one of her classmates in Downing v. Brown. 119 The
teacher held Teresa and her classmate after class one day to resolve their
differences. The teacher believed that the problem was solved even
though Teresa later wrote her a note about her fear of the other girl. A
few days later, the girl attacked Teresa after school and Teresa's mother
sued the school district and the teacher for Teresa's injuries. Summary
judgment was granted in favor of the defendants. The Texas Supreme
Court reviewed the case and determined that the teacher enjoyed qualified immunity from personal liability for her actions in maintaining class120
room discipline.
In Texas Department of CriminalJustice v. Watt,' 2 1 a prison inmate allegedly spit on an officer and was ordered to be placed in a "management
cell". The inmate violently struggled for some time as guards tried to
restrain him and place him in the cell. He died as a result of the struggle.
The inmate's mother filed suit against the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice (TDCJ), and the trial court denied TDCJ's motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the court applied the Chambers official immunity
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

883
See
944
See
See
935
See
949

S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994).
Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467.
S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ).
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d at 715-16.
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1996).
id. at 113.
S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
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test 122 and held that a reasonably prudent officer in the same or similar
circumstances would have believed that the force used to place Watt in
the cell was necessary. 12 3 The court of appeals, therefore, reversed and
124
rendered summary judgment in favor of TDCJ.
B.

TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT

Efforts to bring direct actions against the State pursuant to the limited
waivers of immunity embodied in the Texas Tort Claims Act were slightly
modified by the Legislature in 1997,125 mostly in areas of procedure
rather than substance. Appellate courts are now addressing the 1995
changes to the Texas Tort Claims Act, but again, the changes have had
little effect on substantive issues.
1. Premises or Special Defect
In Sipes v. Texas Department of Transportation,126 Jamie Sipes was
struck by a car when she tried to walk to a store located across the highway. The median at the crossover was covered with tall grass and weeds
that obstructed her view. Sipes sued the Department of Transportation
(DOT) under a premises liability claim based on the Texas Tort Claims
Act, arguing that the weeds were a special defect. Summary judgment
127
was entered in favor of DOT and affirmed by the court of appeals.
The court of appeals held that the vegetation was not a special defect or a
1 28
public nuisance, as required to pierce the State's sovereign immunity.
2.

Condition or Use of Property

In Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. McClain,12 9 Leta McClain, a mental patient at Austin State Hospital, died as
a result of being physically assaulted by Pugh, another resident, with
either a metal rod removed from a hospital locker or a metal foot pedal
removed from his wheelchair. Pugh had a long criminal record and was
involuntarily admitted to the hospital because he was thought to be a
danger to himself and others. McClain's family sued the hospital, alleging
that hospital employees were negligent in allowing Pugh, whose dangerous propensities were known, to have access to either the rod or the
pedal. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals agreed, holding that the hospital's actions
involved the use of tangible property as required by the Texas Tort
130
Claims Act.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See
See
See
See
949
See
See
947
See

supra note 114 and accompanying text.
Watt, 949 S.W.2d at 566.
id. at 567.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, writ denied).
id. at 518, 522.
id. at 521.
S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ requested).
id. at 698.
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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF TORT CLAIMS

With federal legislation becoming more pervasive, the defense of preemption is becoming more common. Last year saw a variety of different
federal statutes working their way into Texas civil litigation.
One example is American Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell.131 In 1952,
Grinnell started smoking cigarettes. Thirty-three years later, he was diagnosed with lung cancer. He filed suit against the manufacturer of the
cigarettes and died before the suit reached trial. His family continued the
suit, pursuing theories of product liability, negligence, misrepresentation,
and breach of warranty. Through a series of motions, the trial court
granted the defendants' summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims.
Finding that the dangers associated with smoking were "common knowledge" from 1952 forward (contrary to the assertions of the defendant and
the tobacco industry, even in sworn testimony before Congress), the
Texas Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment against the defective design theories. 132 However, holding that the addictive nature of tobacco was not common knowledge, the Court remanded the failure to
warn and marketing defects actions to the trial court. 133 Since Congress
enacted federal legislation related to appropriate warnings in 1969,134 any
claims related to warning and marketing defects after 1969 were pre135
empted by federal law.
In Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo,136 Sifuentes was drinking at the
Tigua Indian Reservation Casino and was served alcohol past the point at
which she became obviously intoxicated. She left the casino and was involved in a head-on collision off of the reservation's land. Her estate
sued the Indian tribe that owned and operated the casino, alleging violations of the Dram Shop Act, 137 and other negligent activities. The tribe
argued that it was immune from personal injury suits as a federally recognized Indian Reservation. 38 The court of appeals recognized that no
39
state has allowed a private plaintiff to sue a tribe for personal injuries.
Even though the Dram Shop Act was created pursuant to the state's police powers (which preempt the tribal immunity in the criminal context),
attempting to collect money damages by an injured individual did not
qualify under the limited waiver of the tribe's immunity. 40 Accordingly,
14
the tribe's summary judgment was affirmed. '
In Trevino v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,142 Trevino and
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

951
See
See
See
See
954

S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 428-29.
id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1998).
Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d at 438-40.
S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1997, pet. filed).

137. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2 (Vernon 1995).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See
See
See
See
958

25 U.S.C. § 1300(g) (1983 & Supp. 1997).
Holguin, 954 S.W.2d at 847.
id. at 854.
id.
S.W.2d 204 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet, filed).
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two of her children were killed in an auto-train collision. Suit was filed
against the railroad, alleging negligent failure to warn regarding the crossing. The defendant obtained a summary judgment, arguing that federal
law governed the railroad's duties. Finding that no federal regulations
governed the railroad's duties to warn of the dangers at the particular
crossing where the accident occurred, the court of appeals reversed. 143
Although federal law governs warnings required at federally-funded railroad crossings, the crossing at issue was not specifically covered under the
railway crossing regulations. 4 4
D.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The selection of the cause of action will govern the appropriate statute
of limitations for the plaintiff. Actions sounding in fraud, or governed by
specific statutes, were recently addressed by Texas courts in the context
of personal tort litigation.
In Shannon v. Law-Yone,14 5 plaintiff was admitted to Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion as a voluntary inpatient for treatment and expressed a
desire to end treatment and leave the facility but was discouraged by his
doctor and others. Plaintiff later sued his doctor, other doctors, and the
psychiatric hospital, asserting numerous claims including fraud and negligence. Defendants argued that the suit should be governed by the twoyear statute of limitations because it involved personal injury claims,
rather than the four-year statute of limitations allowed in cases involving
fraud. The trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that "[tjhe mere fact that [plaintiff]
seeks damages more often associated with personal injury claims, i.e.,
emotional and mental anguish, is not determinative of which statute of
limitation applies"; since plaintiff's claims sounded in fraud, the four-year
146
statute governed.
In Reames v. Hawthorne-Seving, Inc.,147 plaintiff was injured on a conveyor belt in 1993. The belt was installed at the plant in 1982. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on a statute of repose requiring that certain suits against one who constructs an
improvement to real property be brought within ten years after the construction of the improvement. The court of appeals held that the conveyor was an improvement to the property and that, because plaintiffs
filed suit more than ten years after the conveyor's installation, their claim
was barred by statute.' 48
143. See id. at 207.
144. See id. at 206; 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20153 (1997).
145. 950 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
146. Id. at 437.
147. 949 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, writ denied).
148. See id. at 762, 764; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009 (Vernon 1986).
For a more detailed analysis of the statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions, see
supra Section I (E)(2).
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VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Efforts to impute the responsibility of one tortfeasor to a different
party were discussed in the context of construction sites and auto accidents in this Survey period. Although changes were made to joint
tortfeasors' liability in chapter 33 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code
in 1995,149 those changes have not yet worked their way into the appellate level.
In Good v. Dow Chemical Co.,150 Good was a pipefitter working for a
company building a hydrocarbon plant for Dow Chemical. While working on the project, Good was injured and sued the owner of the project,
Dow Chemical. Holding that Good's employer was the contractor, and
not Dow Chemical, the appellate court affirmed a summary judgment regarding allegations of an unsafe workplace because the control of Good's
activities fell to his employer. 15 1 Further, Dow Chemical did not retain
152
sufficient control over the project to be responsible as a landowner.
IV.

IMPORTANT ISSUES
A.

DAMAGES

During the Survey period, jury damage awards remained largely unburdened by appellate review, provided an appropriate threshold of evidence was present in the record.
1.

Mental Anguish

Shirley Trevino gave birth to a stillborn baby while under the medical
supervision of Edinburg General Hospital in EdinburgHospital Authority
v. Trevino.153 Both Trevino and her husband sued the hospital and judgment was entered in their favor. One of the elements of damages sought
by the plaintiffs was mental anguish. Trevino offered evidence of her
preparations in expectation of the arrival of her baby, the pain she experienced upon losing the baby, and the deterioration of her marriage that
resulted. The Texas Supreme Court held that the evidence presented related to the grief that Trevino felt over the loss of the baby as a separate
individual, and not as a part of her body. 154 Noting that under Krishnan
v. Sepulveda,155 a woman must provide evidence of mental anguish damages resulting from negligent treatment that causes the loss of a baby as
part of the woman's body, the Court remanded her damage claim to the
149. See
150. 945
151. See
152. See
malpractice
153. 941
154. See
155. 916

TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33 (Vernon 1997).
S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).
id. at 880.
id. at 880-82. See also the discussion of vicarious liability of hospitals for the
of emergency room doctors in supra Section I (E)(1).
S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 79.
S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995).
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trial court for a new trial.15 6
2. Punitive Damages
The codifications of exemplary damage elements in chapter 41 of the
Civil Practice & Remedies Code 157 became effective on September 1,
1995, but have not yet had an impact at the appellate level. Instead, the
Moriel decision' 58 is still having the greatest impact on Texas jurisprudence regarding punitive damages.
After establishing an insurance company's gross negligence, the Texas
Supreme Court has recognized that economic ruin caused by the insurance company's bad faith may support an award of punitive damages. 159
A plaintiff must satisfy the gross negligence standard created by TransportationInsurance Co. v. Moriel,160 which requires proof that the insurance company was actually aware that its actions involved an extreme
risk of harm, such as financial ruin, and was nevertheless consciously indifferent to the insured's rights or welfare. 161 Evidence of that extreme
degree of risk in the form of economic harm will satisfy the evidentiary
162
threshold to support a jury's damage award.
B.

WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES

Inattention to detail proved costly for one set of wrongful death defendants in 1997. In Avila v. St. Luke's Lutheran Hospital,163 Jimenez
died while under the medical care of the defendants. His adult children
filed wrongful death and survival actions against the defendants later that
same year. The case was settled and a final take-nothing judgment was
entered. Later, Jimenez's minor daughter filed a second wrongful death
suit against many of the same defendants. The defendants sought summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel, arguing that the same
issues had been resolved between the same parties in a prior proceeding.
Because the prior suit, the release, and the final judgment were all related
specifically to the adult children and did not purport to represent all
wrongful death beneficiaries, the court held that the minor child was not
a party. 164 Further, the issues of liability were not actually litigated in the
agreed settlement and final judgment. 65 Accordingly, the summary
judgment for the defendants was reversed and the minor child's action
66
remanded for trial.'
156. See Trevino, 941 S.W.2d at 79; see also Parkway Hospital, 941 S.W.2d at 590; supra
notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
157. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 1998).
158. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
159. See Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1997).

160.
161.
162.
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164.
165.
166.
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id. at 19-20.
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S.W.2d 841 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
id. at 855.
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INSURANCE

An insurance company's obligations of defense and indemnification
were often litigated during the past year, with the insurance company
usually seeking a declaratory judgment to resolve its contractual duties.
Although the law related to the issues did not change in 1997, many creative new efforts to invoke coverage were presented to the appellate
courts.
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowan,167 Mr. Gage was a photo
lab clerk who made extra prints of some revealing photos of Ms. Cowan
and distributed them to his friends. Discovering this, Ms. Cowan sued
Mr. Gage, who requested both a defense to the suit and indemnification
for any judgment from his homeowner's insurance policy. The insurance
company ultimately denied coverage, claiming that Ms. Cowan's suit did
not involve a "bodily injury" as defined by the policy and that Mr. Gage's
conduct was not an "accident." The Texas Supreme Court agreed with
both assertions. 168 The Court held that without physical manifestations,
Ms. Cowan's damage claims were for humiliation and embarrassment
only and were not a bodily injury; further, Mr. Gage's intentional tort was
169
not an accident as defined by the policy.
In Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co. v. McKee, 170 McKee's elevenyear-old daughter was injured as a passenger in a one-car accident. McKee sought a declaratory judgment against his business insurance policy,
pursuing underinsured benefits for his daughter. The Texas Supreme
Court rendered judgment for the insurer, holding that the business auto
policy would not provide coverage to family members of business employees. 171 Although McKee was the president and sole shareholder of
the business, he was not the policyholder-the business was. Since the
business had no "family members," the Court held that McKee's daugh172
ter was not entitled to underinsured benefits.
Griffin was injured by gunshots fired from a vehicle driven by Royal in
Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin.173 Griffin sued
Royal and others for his injuries. Seeking both defense and indemnity,
Royal notified his auto insurance carrier. The carrier provided a defense
in the suit (subject to a reservation of the carrier's right to refuse indemnification) and filed an action for a declaration that it had no obligations
to Royal. Finding the allegations in the personal injury suit to be intentional torts, the Texas Supreme Court held that the gunshots constituted
intentional conduct and an exception to the carrier's duty to defend and
174
indemnify.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
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S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 820.
id. at 827.
S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 456.
id. at 457.
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id. at 83.
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In Wessinger v. Fire Insurance Exchange,175 Wessinger got drunk and
inexplicably punched Morrison several times in the face, causing injuries
that included permanent vision loss. Wessinger, in the lawsuit filed by
Morrison, sought coverage for his actions under his homeowner's policy,
arguing that his intoxication meant that his actions (which he did not remember) were not intentional but were merely an accidental result of the
intoxication. In this declaratory judgment action by the homeowner's
carrier, the court of appeals held that voluntary intoxication does not destroy the intentional nature of the conduct; since the conduct was not
"accidental" as covered by the policy, the insurer was not required to
76
indemnify Wessinger for the resulting damages.'
D.

WORKERS'

COMPENSATION

Since the reform of the Workers' Compensation system, very few cases
have been litigated in the trial courts, and even fewer have been appealed; 1997 was no exception.
In Trico Technologies Corp. v. Montiel,177 Montiel was injured on the
job, filed a claim for benefits under Trico's workers' compensation insurance policy, and was later discharged by Trico. After Montiel died, his
wife sued Trico, alleging that Trico wrongfully discharged Montiel in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. During pre-trial discovery, Trico learned that although Montiel stated on his application that
he did not have an alcohol problem, he was a diagnosed alcoholic. The
trial court found for Trico, but the court of appeals reversed. The Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the
after-acquired evidence doctrine (evidence discovered after a hire that
would have prevented the initial hiring) has been adopted as a limitation
on an employee's recovery for a retaliatory discharge claim under the
Workers' Compensation Act. 178 Under the after-acquired evidence doctrine, therefore, an "employee is only entitled to back pay from the date
of the unlawful discharge to the date that the employer discovered evi1 79
dence of the employee's misconduct."'

In Simplex Electric Corp. v. Holcomb, 180 Holcomb, a Simplex employee, was injured at work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation
benefits with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission, which then
notified Simplex. Simplex gave its insurance carrier notice of the claim,
and the carrier had sixty days in which to contest the compensability of
Holcomb's injury. The carrier never formally contested compensability,
and Simplex sought to invoke its right to contest compensability even
though its carrier accepted liability for the payment of benefits. The
175.
176.
177.
178.

949
See
949
See

S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no writ).
id. at 840-41.
S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1997).
id. at 310.

179. Id. at 312.

180. 949 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied).
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Commission determined that Simplex lacked standing to challenge compensability because its carrier missed the statutory deadline. The district
court affirmed the decision, as did the court of appeals.1 81 The appellate
court reasoned that the carrier's inadvertent failure to contest the compensability of the claim by the sixty-day statutory deadline did not give
182
the employer standing to contest the employee's claim.

181. See id. at 447.
182. See id. at 448.
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